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TORTS 
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER 
Cases this year established a few new claims to relief. There now is a 
right to recover for injuries caused by hazards in unlighted doorways of 
apartment buildings, and children are given broader rights to recover from 
landowners for dangerous conditions of the land even though they trespass. 
Wives may now sue for loss of consortium of their husbands, and a court 
has asserted that a civil claim for violation of the constitutional right to 
privacy is actionable under New York law. Other than that, the cases appear 
not to alter prior law basically. They demonstrate again the difficulty faced 
by a plaintiff seeking to recover for police abuse. One case demonstrated the 
grisly fate that may befall an inmate of a state mental institution. Finally, 
sweeping language in a Court of Appeals case seemed to suggest that the 
court may join the courts of several other important states in up-dating 
archaic tort principles to meet current societal needs. 
TORT LIABILITY OF THE STATE 
During the past year the actions of police came under broad public 
scrutiny. While some members of the public were questioning whether the 
police enjoyed excessive latitude, the courts of New York appeared more 
sympathetic. In one case, a group of police intervened in a fight and, in the 
process of removing one of the fighters, knocked down a bystander on 
crutches. Three levels of New York courts agreed that no claim in negligence 
could be made ouLt 
Police immunity in the performance of their duty was even more 
dramatically demonstrated in Stanton v. State.2 After stopping a station 
wagon heading the wrong way on a public highway, a state trooper delayed 
completing his business with the motorist while he waved on other traffic. 
When the motorist decided to make his getaway, there followed the classic 
movie chase. The culprit went racing off in the wrong direction on the road 
with the trooper in hot pursuit, sometimes with his lights off, later with his 
lights back on. Speeds reached up to a hundred miles per hour. The trooper 
overtook his quarry, only to lose him again. Finally the fleeing car 
sideswiped an oncoming vehicle and skidded into another, killing its 
operator. While lamenting the death, the Appellate Division, Third 
Department, found the officer guiltless of negligence on the basis of Vehicle 
George J. Alexander is Professor of Law and Associate Dean at the Syracuse University 
College of Law and a Member of the New York and Illinois Bars. 
I. McEvoy v. City of New York, 20 N.Y.2d 900, 232 N.E.2d 862, 285 N.Y.S.2d S6l\ 
(1967). 
2. 29 App. Div. 2d 612,285 N.Y.S.2d 964 (3d Dep't 1967). 
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and Traffic Law, Section 1104, which expressly allows the exceeding of 
maximum speed limits and the disregarding of regulations governing 
direction for drivers of authorized emergency vehicles. The Court was 
unimpressed with Subsection (d) of Section 1104, which limits the section by 
requiring due regard for the safety of all persons. Curiously, the same court 
within a month decided Tompkins County v. Day.' in which it held the 
qualifying provisions of Section 1104(d) determinative in holding liable a 
police officer, who drove through a stop sign on his way to apprehend a 
"drunk," for failure to be sufficiently careful about cross traffic. With only 
Judge Keating dissenting, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in 
Hacker v. City of New York,4 which denied recovery to a wife accidentally 
shot while her rookie probationary patrolman husband was cleaning his 
revolver. 
The Third Department was quick to deny the Court of Claims' new 
theory that probable cause in false arrest cases could not be established 
through evidence which would be constitutionally inadmissible in a criminal 
proceeding.' It reverted to the distinction between criminal and civil 
proceedings and, additionally, pointed out that the magistrate's arraignment 
which had followed in the case had itself prima facie established probable 
cause:' The result is that one may presumably use statements obtained in 
constitutionally objectionable ways to defeat a false arrest case; one may use 
a magistrate's arraignment (as was historically true) as a prima facie defense 
and, even avoiding these defenses, a successful recovery is far from assured. 
In Graham v. City of New York,7 plaintiff was barely able to escape the 
review of the First Department, Appellate Division, with considerably less 
than half the damages the jury had awarded him at trial. By a majority of 
only one, the Court sustained the jury's finding of lack of probable cause in 
a case which even the dissent described as "so brutally unfair that it was 
impossible to listen to the account without a high degree of indignation."· 
An appellate division also took an opportunity to reverse Harty v. State, 
commented upon in last year's Survey.9 The result is that, though a court 
may lose jurisdiction over a defendant by excessive delay, the resulting 
erroneous sentence is treated as an immune judicial determination. to For the 
same reason, the failure of the clerk of county court to notify a judge that 
plaintiffs probationary period had ended was sufficiently quasi-judicial in 
3. 29 App. Diy. 2d 709, 286 N. Y.S.2d 157 (3d Dep't 1968). 
4. 20 N. Y.2d 722, 229 N.E.2d 613, 283 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1967). 
5. Dixson y. State, 54 Misc. 2d 100,281 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Ct. of Cl. 1967). 
6. Dixson y. State, 30 App. Diy. 2d 626, 290 N.Y.S.2d 68 2 (3d Dep't 1968). 
7. 28 App. Diy. 2d 245, 284 N. Y.S.2d 518 (1st Dep't 1967). 
8. [d. at 252, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 5 25. 
9. Alexander, Torts. 1967 Surrey of N. Y. Law. 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 457, 466 (1968). 
10. Harty y. State, 29 App. Diy. 2d 243, 287 N. Y.S.2d 306 (3d Dep't 1968). 
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nature so that the resulting illegal incarceration for probation violation 
would not support a claim against the state.lI 
On the other hand, the failure of a court clerk to ask a sentenced 
defendant to show cause why judgment should not be pronounced against 
him was treated by the Court of Claims as an act of a different sort" on 
which liability could be predicated. Since primary reliance is placed in that 
case on Hart)' v. State,13 its correctness is questionable. As a federal district 
court found occasion to point out this year, also, failure to perform the duties 
of a court clerk is not cognizable under the Federal Civil Rights Act." 
I f, as is alleged in the public press from time to time, the courts have 
undermined the authority of police or the judicial institution itself, it is not 
evident in the tort cases. 
TORT LAW AND THERAPY 
Again this year the tort cases illustrated the plight in the courts of those 
labeled mentally ill. Consistent with cases cited in the prior section, the state 
is immune from liability for the initial labeling. Thus, a police justice with 
no necessary skills in psychiatry may properly, under Section 870 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, order a person appearing before him to 
psychiatric examination and cannot be sued when it turns out that there is no 
basis for holding the person in psychiatric confinement." This is true, 
irrespective of the triviality of the criminal charges pending. Thus, 
information charging disorderly conduct sufficies.'" If one is found to be 
mentally i II, the  length of p otential  criminal sentence is also not 
determinative. 
In Whitree v. Statel1 the plaintiff had been given a suspended sentence. 
He could at most have been sentenced to a period of three years. He was in 
fact incarcerated in mental hospitals for 14 1/2 years. At least the latter 12 
1/3 years were found by the Court of Claims to have been unnecessary and 
plaintiff received $300,000. in damages for his wrongful confinement. The 
facts brought out in his claim for damages provide one of the most dramatic 
illustrations to date of what it means to be incarcerated in a state mental 
hospital. The case should be required reading for anyone representing a 
released patient. A few of its highlights follow. 
Whitree spent over four years of his confinement {considerably more 
II. Rodriquez v. State, 55 Misc. 2d 669, 285 N. Y.S 2d 896 (Ct. of Cl. 1967). 
12. Corcoran v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 293, 288 N. Y S.2d 801 (Ct. of Cl. 1968). 
13. Harty v. State, supra note 10. 
14. Jernzura v. Belden. 281 F. Supp. 200 (N.D.N. Y. 1968). 
15. Reynolds v. Hart, 54 Misc. 2d 476, 282 N. Y.S 2d 909 (Sup. Ct., Niagara Co. 19(7). 
16. [d. 
17. 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N. Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. of Cl. 1968). 
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than his total criminal sentence could have been) in maximum security, 
locked in his cell except for exercise and toilet requirements. According to his 
unrefuted testimony, he was beaten by attendants. stripped and placed in the 
"Blue Room." The blue room is described as a small dark room without toilet 
or water facilities, and without a bed or mattress. He remained there for 
about eight days on bread and water except for one full meal every three 
days. The testimony of one of the attendants in examination before trial 
revealed his opinion that the patients were like animals who knew when to be 
fed. and that they were like dogs wagging their tails. 
Whitree's damages are themselves illuminating enough to quote at some 
length. 
We note that when Whitree was admitted to the State Hospital he was about 48 years 
of age and in good physical health, although he had sustained a slight knee injury while 
in the Armed Forces. On April 5, 1955, another patient poured hot coffee over him 
causing Iirst degree burns to his face and chest. On March 4, 1961, he was kicked in 
the face: by another patient causing a fracture to 2 upper incisors, 4 lower incisors to 
loo�en, a fracture of the nose, and a laceration requiring 4 sutures to close. On several 
occasions, while Whitree was sleeping, he was struck by other patients and his testicles 
were squeezed. He was struck, kicked and beaten by attendants. The headaches which 
Whitree had through the years since November, 1955, and up to the time of trial, were 
causally related to the injuries reflected by his hospitalization of November 2, 1955. On 
or about September 5, 1950, Whitree sustained a complete fracture of the second 
metacarpal bone of the left hand which healed with deformity. He sustained a 
commmuted fracture of the distal and of the right tibia which healed with deformity. 
He sustained a fracture of the greater tuberosity of the right shoulder which healed with 
deformity. He sustained fractures of the eighth and ninth ribs posteriorly on the left 
side. He sustained an injury in the area of the Iifth and sixth cervical vertebrae which 
resulted in a deformity and compression of the bodies of said vertebrae. That, as a 
consequence of said injury, he developed an osteoarthritic condition in the area of the 
cervical spine. As a consequence of the beating administered to Whitree while a patient 
during the 12-year period aforesaid, he sustained a permanent chronic peritonitis of the 
right shoulder.I' 
Even more frightening than the injuries sustained is the fact that the 
system was found by the court to be wholly incapable of assessing ripeness 
for release. necessitating twelve years of unnecessary incarceration. The 
court characterizes the hospital records as so inadequate that even a layman 
could determine their insufficiency. The court also found that Whitree 
had been examined psychiatrically only seven times in six years. that 
only three of those examinations were of any depth and that they all 
occurred in the first four months of the six-year period. It found that the 
timing of some of the psychiatric examinations coming close on the heels of 
a serious medical condition made them of questionable value. and noted that 
the psychiatrist's apparent lack of appreciation of this fact cast grave doubts 
upon his competency. It found a close temporal correlation between the 
I�. [d. at 710, 290 N.V.S.2d at 504. 
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times of examination and applications for writs of habeas corpus or hearings 
on such writs. Finally, it found that Whitree was never exposed to 
psychotherapy or psychological testing during his entire time at the hospital. 
It seems almost an understatement for the court to conclude that the "record 
is, in fact, redolent with callous contempt for the claimant herein."I" 
In a warning judgment, the court concluded: 
We believe we understand the immense difficulties faced by the State in financing. 
staffing, and administering as vast a complex as Matteawan State Hospital. as well as 
the other state hospitals. However, society denominates these institutions as hospitals 
and they should be so conducted. If they are to be no more than pens into which we are 
to sweep that which is ofiensive to 'normal society' let us be honest and denominate 
them as such. Certainly, as we demean the least of us, so we demean us all.'" 
While the Whitree case is singular in its probing examination of mental 
incarceration, it is not unique in holding the state liable for malpractice in its 
state hospitals. Some cases were reviewed in the Survey last year.Zl This year 
the State was held for the death of a seventeen year old patient who was 
admitted with a temperature of 10\.8, apparently not treated for her medical 
condition and not transferred to a medical facility until four days later, at 
which time she had a temperature of 106 degrees.22 Almost trivial by 
comparison is the unsuccessful claim of Helen Krieger in which she sought 
an award for being required, while an inmate in Gowanda State Hospital, to 
work six days a week at mopping floors, cleaning toilets and similar work. 
The court held the work not to have been arduous enough to amount to 
involuntary servitude and refused to compensate.v 
The Court of Appeals, this year, announced a very interesting and novd 
theory of physician liability in Tofh v. Community Hospital at Glen Cov(;';' 
Although noting that a physician meets his obligation of reasonable care 
when his practice accords with practice acceptable in the medical 
community, he may fail in his obligation to use his own best judgment when 
he fails to require more careful practice than the community standard would 
suggest. It was apparently adequate medical procedure to administer oxygen 
to prematurely born children at the rate of six liters per minute. The 
attending pediatriCian, however, thought the quantity excessive for children of 
that age and ordered oxygen to be administered at the rate of four liters p"er 
minute after the first twelve hours. The nurses at defendant hospital 
continued to administer six liters with disasterous effect. For his failure to 
note the deviation from his instructions, the physician, as well as the 
hospital, was held liable. 
19. [d. at 708·09, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 502. 
20. [d. at 711, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 504·05. 
21. Alexander, Torts, supra note 9 at 467·69. 
22. Soto v. State, 55 Misc. 2d 1035, 286 N. Y.S.2d 993 (Ct. of Cl. 1968). 
23. Krieger v. State, 54 Misc. 2d 583, 283 N.Y.S.2d 86 (Ct. of Cl. 1966). 
24. 22 N. Y.2d 255, 239 N.E.2d 368, 292 N. Y.S.2d 440 (1968). 
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With one bold stroke. and by a majority of only one vote on the court. 
Judge Keating has basically altered the low standard of care traditionall} 
applied to the medical profession. While the decision does nothing to alter 
the fact that the medical profession is essentially allowed to establish its own 
�tandard of care by its own definition of what is acceptable. in holding a 
physician to the exercise of his own higher notion of care. the court has. for 
good physicians at least. come close to reestablishing the general standard of 
reasonable care under the circumstances for physicians. It follows. from this 
decision. that a physician is held to two separate standards of care: that 
minimal standard set by acceptable medical practice in the community and. 
additionally. a standard to be judged by the physician's personal kno\\ledge 
and information. 
Compensating those harmed in this case appears to be in line \\ith the 
general movement away from immunities in tort law. It should also be noted 
that in the To/h case the hospital was held liable for the failure of its nurses 
to follow instructions. The court reasoned that hospitals could not both 
immunize themselves by claiming independence from physicians practicing at 
the hospital (an independence which the Court of Appeals this year held bars 
liability for the novelty of an unsuccessful operation conducted by a private 
practitioner in the hospital).�' and then fail to follow physicians' instructions 
with impunity. The community hospital was found a proper defendant. 
INTENTIONAL TORTS 
The problems of accommodating constitutional First Amendment rights 
and the law of defamation and privacy. more fully surveyed last year.> were 
still actively pursued in New York courts. Linus Pauling'- was recognized as 
appropriately within the Sell' }'ork Times \'. Sullimll rule." and thus 
d efamat ory comments  a b o u t  him w e re d e emed protected  by a 
constitutional qualified privilege. Similarly. Thomas R. Gilligan \\ ho ob­
tained national fame through his appearance on a CO R E poster \\ ith the 
caption "Wanted for Murder" was also held wit hin the  ambit of 
constitutional privilege. although litigation progressed as to \\ hether the 
privilege had been exceeded.'" 
Warren Spahn was back in the Court of Appeals in his seesa\\ battle 
25. Fiorentino v. Wenger. 19 N.Y.2d 407.227 N.E.2d 296. 280 '\.Y.S.2d 373 (1967). 
26. Alexander. Torts. supra note 9 at 457-63. 
27. Pauling v. National Re\'iew. Inc .• 22 N.Y.2d 818. 239 N.E.2d 654. 292 '\.Y.S.2d 913 
(I 96X). 
2X. New York Timt:S Co. v. Sullh'an. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
29. Gilhgan v. Farmer. 30 App. Div. 2d 26. 289 N. Y.S.2d 846 (1st Dep't 1968): Gilligan \. 
Kmg. 2'} App. Dlv. 2d 935, 290 N. Y.S.2d 1014 (1st Dep't 1965): Gilligan v. !-armer. 29 -\pp. Di\. 
2d ')35. 2')0 N. Y.S.2d 1014 (1st Dep't 1965). 
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with the Courts. Again, he won in the New York courts,!" the Court of 
Appeals finding that intentional fictualization was sufficiently close to the 
Supreme Court's mandate of calculated falsehood so as to make it 
actionable. Judge Bergan, dissenting, commented: 
The direction of movement of the cases interpreting the constitutionally shielded 
freedom of the press suggests that the protection to defendants should now be more 
broadly based than either the narrow grounds that would rest on the Hil criteria. or 
those laid down by our prior decisions. It does not seem probable; reading Hil and 
New York Times together, that fiction alone concerning a public figure, actionable 
under the New York statute as construed, is any longer actionable. 
Spahn is a public figure by his own choice. He is not a public official coming 
literally within New York Times or Garrison, but the right to print and publish 
material about a public figure rests on similar policy considerations even though the) 
are not chosen at elections after public debate on their merits. A vast area of public 
discussion would be closed off if the press could speak much less freely of public figures 
than of public officials." 
More pragmatically Judge Bergan noted: 
Had the Supreme Court agreed with our decision . . . upholding the constitutional 
validity of Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law as applied to Spahn's case. it 
would normally have affirmed in due course. Instead, it remanded the case back here 
for further consideration. . . .  
This seems to imply that on the present record the Court disagrees with our earlier 
determination to sustain this statute against the argument of defendants that, a_ 
invoked by Spahn, it invades the constitutionally protected freedom of press." 
If Judge Bergan is correct, and his reasoning is persuasive, the Supreme 
Court may again deny Spahn recovery. 
In another case this year the Appellate Division, First Department, 
applied free speech concepts to public debate. In the heated debate over a 
civilian review board in �ew York City, a number of public statements were 
issued. One of them drew a response, not on the merits of the civilian review 
board, but on the legitimacy of the type of ad that had been run. The 
published response suggested that the advertising firm responsible had used 
advertising to exploit and incite emotion and had done a disservice to the 
advertising industry. The rejoinder to the response was a lawsuit in 
defamation. The court held it to be without merit for several reasons, 
including freedom of speech.33 The result of the case is probably to broaden 
the rule which allows comment with constitutional immunity under the ,v t'll' 
York Times rule to such an extent that one may now comment not only 
about those engaged in public life, but their press agents as well. 
30. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d ):;32 
(1967). 
31. Id. at 130-31, 233 N.E.24 at 844, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 837-38. 
32. Id. at 129, 233 N.E.2d at 843, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 836. 
33. Cole Fischer Rogow, Inc. v. Carl Ally, Inc., 29 App. Div. 2d 423, 288 N. Y5.2d 556 
(1st Dep't 1968). 
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Whether the last holding suggests that attorneys can appropriately be 
drawn into the constitutionally exposed area by operation of their client's 
public status is not known. This much is clear. Where lawyers are defamed 
in the course of a lawsuit, in comments appropriate to the proceedings, the 
defamers are even more immune since the comment is subject to the absolute 
privilege attending judicial proceedings.3� Similarly, where complaint is made 
of lawyers to grievance committees of the bar, even though those groups are 
not strictly speaking judicial bodies, absolute privilege applies to avoid 
defamation recovery." The bar and judiciary had protected their own right 
of internal free expression long before the Supreme Court applied a rule to 
public discussion generally. 
One of the sillier vestiges of the common law in the defamation area is a 
distinction between the four categories of slander per se (actionable without 
special damage), and the remaining cases of slander, for which special 
damage must be demonstrated. The existence of these four special categories 
makes it necessary not only to determine whether words are defamatory, a 
task difficult enough in itself, but also whether they are defamatory in one of 
the specified ways. Several cases this year demonstrate to what lengths such 
inquiry can go. The statement "She receives at least $15,000 per annum in 
gifts from friends (especially men) and relatives, most or all of which she 
spt:nds on luxuries, sirch as her expensive apartment, her clothes, travel, 
hotds, restaurants and other tokens of affection" was held not within the 
category of imputing unchastity in a woman.)& Calling a rabbi a crook was 
held not within the category of injuring a person in his business or 
profession." Similarly, accusing a physician of being part of a Communist 
plot to remove the speaker from office was held not to qualify;" The rabbi's 
case clarified the third of the categories, that of charging a person with 
crime, by resolving a long-standing dispute as to whether the crime had to be 
34. Holzb�rg v. Roth�nberg, 28 App. Div. 2d 875, 281 N.Y.S.2d 931 (2d Dep't 1967): 
Zlmm�rman v. Kallimopoulou, 56 Misc. 2d 828, 290 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. City Ct., N.Y. Co. 
19(7). 
35. Wien�r v. Weintraub, 2 2  N.Y.2d 330, 239 N.E.2d 540, 292 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1968): 
Sulhvan v. Crisona. 54 Misc. 2d 478. 283 N. Y.S.2d 6 2  (Sup. Ct.  N.Y. Co. (967). 
36. Zimmerman v. Kallimopouli. 56 Misc. 2d 828. 831. 290 N. Y.S.2d 270. 273 (N. Y. City 
Ct .. N Y. Co. (967). See also Hewitt v. Wasek. 35 Misc. 2d 946. 947. 231 N.Y.S.2d 884. 885 
(Sup. Ct .. Chemung Co. (962) (a married woman was "keeping company with and having an 
affdir with a married man"); Morris v. Stellakis. 27 Misc. 2d 120. 121-2 2,212 N.Y.S.2d 488. 
490 (Sup. Ct .• Qu��ns Co. (961) ( "I could tell you a few things that went on in that apartment 
with her and h�r boy friends . . . .  That isn't even your own apartment. . . .  You had men or a 
mdn paying the rent"): Bolton \'. Strawbridge. 156 N.Y.S.2d 722, 724 (Sup. Ct., Westchester Co. 
(956) ( "You'd do anything for five dollars, so I am told in the village"); Taylor v. Wallace, 31 
MIsc. 393, 64 N.Y.S. 271 (Sup. Ct.  Kings Co. 1900) ( " She came down here and coaxed my 
bartender to stay with her all night"). 
37. Klein v. McGauley. 29 App. Div. 2d 418.288 N.Y.S.2d 751 (2d Dep't (968). 
3». Nadrowski v. Wazeter. 29 App. Div. 2d 741. 286 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1st Dep't (968). 
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one involving moral turpitude or infamous punishment. The Appellate 
Division, Second Department, having previously ruled in the negative. this 
year brought itself into line by expressly overruling its prior determination. ". 
That leaves only one category of slander per se: charging a person with 
venereal disease or leprosy. In that category, no cases were found this year. 
Of considerably greater import is a lawsuit brought by Ralph Nader 
against the General Motors Corporation40 in which he established a hitherto 
unrecognized claim for recovery in New York: invasion of a constitutional 
right of privacy. Since an early case in New York;' recovery for right of 
privacy has been limited to the confines of the Civil Rights Law Sections 50 
and 51, which deal exclusively with commercial appropriation of a person's 
name or picture. Nader complained of intrusions into his life through threaten­
ing phone calls, tapped telephones and enticing women. A New York County 
Supreme Court found in constitutional cases·" the basis for a civil action for 
invasion of the classic right of privacy: the right to be left alone. Less 
.. generously the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York held that New York motorists had no such right. It denied a claim 
brought by Corliss Lamont against the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to 
prevent the sale of motor vehicle registration records to private entrepreneurs 
who use the list to inundate defenseless motorists with promotional 
literature}) Mr. Nader, having struck a blow for safer cars for motorists, 
has now established a new right to be left alone. Mr. Lamont. lamentably. has 
failed to establish the rights of motorists to be left alone. 
Concerning the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress. a number 
of problems remain unresolved in New York, as in other states. One of the 
most difficult problems is the question of the right to recover for witnessing 
tortious conduct inflicted on others. The cases were easily resolved before 
Battalla v. StateH made it possible to bring suit for psychic damage 
unaccompanied by impact. Even after Battalla, the courts seemed inclined to 
disallow claims of persons wl)o were not the direct objects of the tortiou'i 
conduct, even if they were as Closely related as parents}' Then came Haight 
39. Klein v. McGauley. supra note 37. 
40. Nader v. General Motors Corp., 57 Misc. 2d 301. 292 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup. Ct.. N.'\' 
Co. 1968). 
41. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co .• 171 N.Y. 538.64 N.E. 442 (1902). 
42. Tehan v. United States ex rei. Shott. 382 U.S. 406 (1965); Griswold v. State ofConnecll­
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Shelley v. Kraemer. 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Afro-American Publishing Co 
v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
43. Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. 269 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N. Y.). aU'd. 3K6 
F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967). 
44. 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 7 29. 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961), ol'erruling Mitchell \. 
Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107. 45 N.E. 354 (1897). 
45. Kalina v. Syracuse Gen. Hosp., 31 Misc. 2d 18, 220 N.Y. S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct . 
Onondaga Co. 1961), a/rd, 18 App. Div. 2d 757, 235 N.Y.S.2d 808 (4th Dep't 1962). a/l'd. 13 
N. Y.2d 1023, 195 N.E.2d 309, 245 N. Y.S.2d 599 (1963). 
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V. McEwen4', which allowed recovery to a mother for witnessing the death of 
her boy. The case was curious in that it placed reliance primarily on English 
cases which had been since limited, and a lower court California case which 
had been reversed. It was completely untroubled by the contrary New York 
authority though that authority was squarely on point.47 
This year, a court divorced itself from precedent even more in arriving 
at the same result. In Tobin v. Grossman" the supreme court upheld an 
action by a mother who witnessed her infant son being run down. In 
concluding that such injury was compensable, Tobin not only ignored the 
cases that had been ignored in McEwen, but ignored McEwen as well. 
Instead, the court returned to Battalla as providing the basic theory for 
recovery and tinally stated what it considered to be the perimeters of the tort: 
It would seem that recovery must be limited to those persons who can demonstrate 
that they were in a position physically to have been affected or influenced directly and 
not vicariously by the tortious acts at the time of their commission and not at any 
subsequent time." 
However, in Campbell v. Westmoreland Farm, Inc.,''' parents claimed 
negligent infliction of mental distress resulting from a number of drivers 
leaving the scene of an accident in which their child was killed by one of 
them. It is not surprising that a federal district court, applying New York 
law, acknowledged Battalla and Haight as applicable cases, yet found Kalina 
\'. General Hospital of the City of Syracuse determinative and denied 
recovery. As far as precedent is concerned, the federal court's choice seems 
correct. 
Reviewing the same precedent the Appellate Division, Third 
Department, then reversed Tobin v .  Grossman,l stating: "We note that in 
nearly all the jurisdictions where the issue has been considered, recovery has 
been denied."" It placed primary reliance on the decision of the California 
Supreme Court in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.,') denying 
recovery. Curiously, California has just reversed its stand in Dillon v. Legg,!' 
and thus again, reference to the law of California had led a New York court 
astray. 
In light of the prior instability of the law pertaining to bystanders in 
46. 43 Misc. 2d 582, 251 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct., Oneida Co. 1964). 
47. St't' Recent Decision. Mental Fright and Subsequent Injuries Occasioned by Witnessing 
'v,gligt'nt Ad to Third Party for Cause of Action, 16 SYRACUSE L. REV. 18 2 (1964). 
48. 55 Misc. 2d 304, 284 N. Y.S.2d 997 (Sup. Ct., Albany Co. 1967), m,'d, 30 App. Div. 
2d 229, 291 N.Y.S.2d 227 (3d Dep't 1968). 
49. Id. at 306, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 10. 
50. 270 F. Supp. 188 (E.D.N. Y. 1967). 
51. 30 App. Div. 2d 2 29, 291 N. Y.S.2d 227 (3d Dep't 1968). 
52. Id.at 232, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 229. 
53. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). 
54. 68 Cal. 766, M1 P.2d 912,69 Cal. Rptr. 7 2  (1968). 
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New York and California, one would expect that the issue is not finally 
settled in this state. The trend toward greater compensation for ps)chic 
injury begun in Battalla might still prove as irresistible as it proved to be in 
California. Certainly, the limitation which precludes all bystanders from 
obtaining relief cannot be easily logically justified. 
In any event, even cases permitting recovery have at best, to date, 
established that right on the part of a member of the family actually present 
at the time of the allegedly wrongful act. Similar shock on hearing the ne\\� 
does not suffice." Parents removed from the scene are relegated to more 
traditional causes of action, or to the cases which proved to be a 
progenitor of intentional infliction of mental distress: those connected \\ ith 
rights in dead bodies.56 
Discarded wives had no better luck in pressing intentional infliction or 
mental distress suits against their former husbands or the women they held 
out as their current wives irrespective of the legality of the second 
relationship.s7 The Court of Appeals pointed out that to allow such claims 
would both violate legislative policy against actions for alienation of 
affection and criminal conversation, and would intervene inappropriately in 
domestic affairs. 
No more successful was a mother who donated one of her kidne) .. to 
prevent the death of her son. She also was denied recovery for the allegedl) 
negligent conduct in removing her son's kidneys. Her theory, ingeniou"l). 
was that she was a rescuer and thus entitled to the benefits of the rescue 
doctrine. The court concluded that a rescuer might recover for unfore�een 
hazards, but held the rescue doctrine inapplicable to a calculated sacrifice. It 
determined that plaintiffs theory was really novel and then invoked the 
chilling language of the Williams case,s, noted last year, in denying 
recovery. ," 
I f a parent cannot recovery for injury to his child, it seems symmetrIcal 
not to hold him responsible for injury caused by his child. That. also, is still 
the law,"" although exceptions exist.61 
55. Markowitz v. Fein, 30 App. Div. 2d 515, 290 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1st Dep't 1965). 
56. Id. 
57. Cummings v. Kaminski, 56 Misc. 2d 784, 290 N.Y.S.2d 408 (Sup. Ct., King� Co 
1968); Weicker v. Weicker, 22 N.Y.2d 8, 237 N.E.2d 876, 290 N.Y.S.2d 732 ( l96S). 
58. Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 8s5 (1966). 
59. Sirianni v. Anna, 55 Misc. 2d 553, 285 N.y.s.2d 709 (Sup. Ct., Niagara Co. 19(7). 
60. Shaw v. Roth, 54 Misc. 2d 418, 282 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co. 19(7). 
61. See. e.g .. Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 App. Div. 518, 519, 293 N.Y.S. 147. 149 (�t.l 
Dep't 1937), wherein the court said: 
There are situations in which the parent may be held liable: (1) Where the relation�hip 
of master and servant exists and the child is acting within the scope of hi� authonty 
accorded by the parent; ( 2) where a parent is negligent in intrusting to the child an 
instrument which, because of its nature, use and purpose, is so dangerous as to 
HeinOnline -- 20 Syracuse L. Rev. 435 1968-1969
TORTS 435 
CO:\l\lERCIAL TORTS 
Court intervention in business practices relating to competition is a 
delicate thing indeed. On the one hand, courts accept the aggressiveness of 
competition as a necessary part of the competitive scheme, and to some 
extent they intervene to make the process more aggressive through the 
enforcement of the anti-trust laws. On the other hand, traditional tort 
concerns with ethical practices require courts to prohibit aggressive practices. 
When one throws into the balance the peculiar interests of society in 
employee mobility, the complexities rise significantly. This year New York 
courts had to grapple again with striking the balance in a number of cases, 
none of which provided dramatic innovation. 
In Salt'/" Bee} Co. v. Northern Boneless Bee}; Inc.,6� the court refused to 
intervene in a suit challenging the establishment of a competitive enterprise 
to which a number of plaintiffs key personnel transferred. The court found 
that the skills and business accumen taken by the former employees to the 
new company were not of a specialized type and that no trade secrets were 
involved. The customer lists to be used by the new competitor were lists 
which were found to be readily available from telephone directories and trade 
manuals, and the continued patronage of the former customers was found 
primarily to turn on the good will that had been built up by the transferring 
employees. On the other hand, plaintiffs former general manager and its 
buyer and production supervisor were held potentially liable to plaintiff for 
accepting a stock interest in the new competitive corporation while still 
employed by plaintiff. Thus was a balance struck between the needs of 
employee mobility and those of employee loyalty in this case. 
On the other hand, where a wholly independent concern was able to 
obtain business by fraudulently obtaining confidential price proposals of a 
competitor, it was held liable for the damages occasioned by its obtaining a 
public contract for the manufacture and instaIIation of toII-coIIection 
equipment on the Connecticut Turnpike by under-bidding.") Linking a proper 
competitive act to an act violating elementary business morality, in the eyes 
of the court, sufficed to destroy the right to compete. Even so, a majority of 
constitute, in the hands of the child, an unreasonable risk to others; (3) where a parent 
is negligent in intrusting to the child an instrumentality which, though not necessarily a 
dangerous thing of itself, is likely to be put to a dangerous use because of the known 
propensities of the child; (4) where the parent's negligence consists entirely of his failure 
reasonably to restrain the child from vicious conduct imperilling others, when the 
parent has knowledge of the child's propensity toward such conduct; and (5) where the 
parent participates in the child's tortious act by consenting to it or by ratifying it later 
and accepting the fruits. 
62. 20 N.Y.2d 910, 233 N.E.2d 125, 286 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1967). 
63. American Electronics, Inc. v. Neptune Meter Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 117, 290 N. Y. S.2d 
333 (l st Dep't 1968). 
HeinOnline -- 20 Syracuse L. Rev. 436 1968-1969
436 SYRA CLSE LA TV REVIEW 
the court felt that punitive damages could not appropriately be applied to 
such a case and reversed as to them. Since courts do seek to obtam the 
competition provided by the defendant and would, absent fraudulent conduct. 
applaud its obtaining a public contract by bidding a lower price, limiting the 
recovery to compensating plaintiff for actual loss. without giving it a further 
competitive edge through punitive damages, seems a desirable balance. The 
Appellate Division, First Department, held that a manufacturer of machine .. 
could not set up a patent-like restriction on the use o f  his machine., to 
prevent copying by competitors.h� The plaintif f  had attempted to prevent the 
machines from falling into a copier's hands by limiting its use in the hand .. 
of purchasers and expressly prohibiting third party use of the purchased 
machine. The court's conclusion that such an attempted insulation from 
competitive copy'ing is improper seems unimpeachable in light of the strong 
public policy prohibiting interference with product simulation." In another 
case the Court of Appeals held that an arbitration provision in the contract 
did not require the arbitration of an antitrust claim:" I n so holding, the 
court asserted that the public interest in antitrust litigation required access to 
courts. It is. o f  course. true that there is a strong public interest in the 
enforcement of antitrust provisions. One might still be sanguine about the 
opposite result in this case, recognizing that the primary authority for 
enforcing the antitrust laws lies in the federal and state governments. 
'-onetheless. private enrorcement or the antitrust laws makes a genuine 
contribution and presumably. the Court or Appeals feels this contribution 
needs judicial support despite the strong public policy generally favoring 
arbitration. 
-\s a persvn cannot restrict the use of a machine he has designed and 
put into public use. so a person is prohibited from preventing the attribution 
to him of authorship or performance of a work. all rights to which have been 
sold. Thu�. irrespective of his desire to restrict identification, an artist ma:­
not prohibit the use of his name on a record that is legally prodm:ed of hI'> 
\\ork. Thi� doc� not mean. ho\\evcr. that there may not be valid objection to 
a mi�dc�cription of an artist's contribution which would mislcad the public 
into belicving it \\as obtaining more by purchase than in fact it would and 
\\ hich \\ould deprivc thc artist of the additional revcnue which hc would get 
through .,alc of a broader pcrformancc. Thus, invoking Section 43(a) or the 
Lanham \ct. an artist \\a., able this year to obtain a preliminary injunction 
again.,t thc U.,c of hi., namc on thc jacket of a rccord in which he did 
64. \lerchant '>uppher, Paper (0 .. Inc, \. Photo· Marker (orp .. 29 App. DIV, 2d Y4. �x5 
, Y,'> �d 93� (I,t Dep't (967), 
65, �ear, Roehuck &. ( 0, \, "und (0 .• 376 L S. 225 (1964): (ompco (orr \' D.I} Bm.: 
Ilghtmg. Inc. 376 l ,,>, 234 (1964), 
66. \Imcce \\hobalc (orp. \. Tomar Product... Inc . . 21 '.Y.2d 621. 237 :-;.1.2d 2�3. :!XY 
, Y " �d '.I6X ,I '.I6X) 
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perform, but in which his performance was trivial." The artist had since 
developed a reputation as a lead guitarist and singer in a three man group. 
On the record he provided conventional guitar accompaniment. Under these 
circumstances the court felt that the likelihood of consumer confusion was 
�ufficient under the broad provisions of the Lanham Act to provide relief. 
NO:-;)lSTE:-;T10:-;AL TORTS 
No one any longer doubts that the citadel has fallen. The question IS 
what survives.'" Just as in the period in which warranty was in the 
ascendancy, a number of courts had to concern themselves with the question 
of whether actions sounded in tort or contract, now that strict liability in 
tort appears to be superceding warranty, the same questions recur. Several 
answers were provided this year. For purposes of the statute of limitations, 
injury resulting from a hay elevator col lapse was chargeable to the 
manufacturer despite the fact that the statute of limitations in warranty had 
run." The court opined that strict liability in tort was now an appropriate 
theory in New York and that consequently the tort statute of limitations 
was applicable. The Court of Appeals, in a memorandum decision, approved 
a similar conclusion with respect to N. Y. C PLR Section 5001 (a) thus 
refusing to allow interest on a judgment obtained for personal injuries 
resulting from an exploding bottle:" Although the claim was denominated a 
claim in warranty, the court held it instead to be a claim sounding essentially 
in tort. The CPLR interest provision allows interest only for breach of 
contract. 
The new ease of reaching a manufacturer in tort or contract does not, of 
course, guarantee that someone injured by a manufacturer's product will 
obtain recovery. At a minimum he must still demonstrate a defect in the 
product and a causal connection between that defect and his injury. Thus, for 
e\amp\e, a manufacturer of automobiles was held not responsible for the 
failure of brakes after brake fluid leaked out of the system.?1 Plaintiff 
theorized that the manufacturer should have installed a warning device to 
note loss of hydraulic fluid, but the court held the automobile not to have 
been defectively constructed for failure of such a device. Similarly, in 
67. Yamt:ta Co. v. Capitol Rt:cords, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
6S. Donnt:lly" IJler Ihe Fall oj the Citadel: Exploitation oj the Victvry or Consideration oj 
1I 11l1t'rt'll\'. 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. I (1967). 
69. Wilsey v. Sam Mulkt:y Co .• 56 Misc. 2d 480,289 N.Y.S.2d 307 ( Sup. Ct.. Broome Co. 
I%S); hut �Ct" Mendd v. Pittsburgh Platt: Glass Co., 57 Misc. 2d 45. 291 N.Y.�.2d 94 (Sup. 
CI., Monrot: Co. 1967) (applying contracts limitations). !-or a discussion of these cases see 
[Jonndly, (ulIIIIler<lal Lall' .'>aln. 1968 Sun'e\' of ,\.}. Law, 20 SYRACUSl L. REV, 324, 
327-30 (196'1). 
70. Gillespie v. ureat Atlantic", Pacific Tea Co., 21 N.Y.2d 823, 235 N.c.2d 911, 288 
N,Y.S.2d 907 (I96S) (mem.). 
71. McNally v. Chrysler Motors Corp .• 55 Misc. 2d 128, 284 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup. Ct.. 
Kmgs Co. (967). 
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Schwartz v. Macrose Lumber and Trim Co.n plaintiff failed to make 
out his case when he demonstrated that a nail shattered and that something 
flew into his eye causing damage. The court held it equally possible that he 
could have been injured from a wood splinter or from some other cause. 
New York once held out against an attractive nuisance doctrine for 
injuries to children but that era has apparently ended. In Pattersull I'. 
Proctor Paint & Varnish Co . . 7 .• the Court of Appeals allowed a negligence 
action to be maintained by a twelve year old trespassing boy who carrkd a 
pail of inflammable liquid from defendant's property, and was subsequently 
injured when he played fireman and poured the water-like substance on a 
fire, causing personal injury. The court carefully reviewed prior cases and 
then concluded that: 
The main body of decisions in this court instructs us that the rule today is that if 
the owner of land leaves it open and accessible to children; if he knows that children use 
it  for play; and if he leaves accessible to them highly volatile substances, a ca�e primd 
facie is made out if a child is thus injured." 
The court also noted that there had been an abandonment of the trespass 
defense to personal injury actions for children in other cases in which there 
was a dangerous condition on land. While, in this case, it was possible for 
the court to limit its holding to dangerous volatile substances, presumably it 
was serving notice as well that attractive nuisance would apply to other 
forms of danger in the future. Where no trespass is involved, a landowner 
has traditionally had an obligation to keep his premises in a condition which 
does not present undue hazards for children playing thereon, when he has 
notice that they customarily use them for play.75 
When a state statute prescribes conduct designed to insure safety to 
others, a violation of that statute may either constitute negligence or it may 
give rise to absolute liability. The test is whether the statute is primarily 
designed for the protection of a group in which plaintiff is included. The 
Court of Appeals this year enlarged the latter category of statute violation 
significantly by holding that a statute requiring school bus drivers to instruct 
pupils to cross in front of the bus and that he await their crossing before 
leaving was of the category for which violation created absolute liability' ' 
This appears to be the first case in which absolute liability has been imposed 
on a regulation governing motor vehicle or pedestrian safety. As the dissent 
pointed out: 
72. 29 App. Div. 2d 781, 287 N.Y.S.2d 706 (2d Dep't 1968) (mem.). 
73. 21 N.Y.2d 447,235 N.E.2d 765, 288 N. Y.S.2d 6 2 2  (1968). 
74. Id. at 453, 235 N.E.2d at 768, 288 N. Y.S.2d at 627. 
75. Cuevas v. 73rd .I< Central Park West Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 745, 234 N .E .2d 843. 2S7 
N. Y.S.2d 889 (1968) (mem.). 
76. Van Gaasbeck v. Webatuck Cent. School Dist. No. 1, 21 N.Y.2d 239. 234 N.E.2d 243. 
287 N. Y.S.2d 77 (1967). 
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It would be easy to say that any statute prescribing standards of reasonable care is 
e:nacted for the benefit of a special class of persons as, for example, the protection of 
motorists in particular traffic situations, school children or other pedestrians crossing 
the: streets, and many other specified uses of the streets and highways." 
439 
The distinction is a significant one because where the statute is interpreted as 
merely establishing a standard of care, contributory negligence applies while, 
in cases such as the one under discussion, it does not. Since the child was 
found to be contributorily negligent, the wrongful death part of the claim 
against the bus driver, based on negligence, was dismissed. Had the statute 
been otherwise interpreted, the entire claim would have been lost. 
One can only speculate, at this point, how far the court will in the 
future apply motor vehicular regulation in this manner. It seems unlikely, the 
dissent's comments notwithstanding, that the court will similarly interpret all 
the statutory requirements of motor vehicles. When the time comes to 
distinguish one type of motor vehicle regulation from another, it wiII 
probably prove a fairly simple matter to distinguish the legislature's special 
concern for the safety of school children on school busses from its general 
concern for the safety of pedestrians and motorists. 
Even the application of statutory violation as negligence per se, of 
course, provides a great deal of help to plaintiffs. I n  Rees v. Grandelli,7' 
defendant stopped his car on a highway after having been hit by another 
motorist. He got out to exchange information with the other driver and, 
during this time an interval of five minutes or so-his car was hit in the 
rt:ar by plaintiff. While the jury might, under these circumstances, have 
found negligence in leaving the car on the highway, it surely could also have 
found that the conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. That 
question was removed from it by the court which charged that leaving a 
parked car on the highway was a violation of Section 1200 of the Vehicle 
and Traffic Law and was consequently negligence as a matter of law. The 
Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed without opinion over a 
vigorous dissent which suggested that the violation in this case might have 
been a reasonable and, consequently, permissible violation of the statute. 
I n  another case demonstrating some liberality toward plaintiff, the 
Court of Appeals approved, without opinion, a death recovery for one of two 
occupants of a two-seater plane, which either of them might have been flying 
at the time it rolled over twice and fell to the ground killing both of them." 
The court found it permissible for the jury to determine whether the 
defendant's testate was piloting the plane, though there was no evidence on 
that point and the controls permitted either passenger to fly. Having 
determined the question of who was flying, the jury was instructed that it 
77. [d. at 247-4S, 234 N.E.2d at 248, 287 N. Y.S.2d at 84 (dissenting opinion). 
78. 2S App. Div. 2d 565, 282 N. Y.S.2d 662 (2d Dep't 1967) (mem.). 
79. Suiter v. Colla mer, 21 N.Y.2d 844, 235 N.E.2d 924, 288 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1968) (mem.). 
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could apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to hold the !lier. even though 
there was no direct evidence from which to determine whether pilot error or 
a defect in the plane caused the crash. Thus. the court approved a recovery in 
a case in which both the elements of control of the instrumentality and 
probability of negligent conduct were quite loosely demonstrated. 
Approving another trial recovery. the Court of Appeals overruled the 
common law rule denying a duty upon owners of public buildings to light 
building exteriors.'" That rule. according to the court. was a product of a 
time during which an obligation to provide exterior light was far more 
arduous than it presently is. After the Williams case of last year. the court's 
language is heartening indeed. 
It is saying the obvious but it bears repetition that whether a society will tolc:rah: a 
particular course of conduct is. to a large measure. dependent upon the deve\opmc:nt of 
society at the particular moment when the courts are called upon to enunciate a proper 
standard of care. We can conceive of no reason why at the present time the: owner of a 
public building should not be required to light the exterior of his buiIdmg at those lime. 
when it is open to the public. The traditional rule: no longe:r expresses a standard of care 
which accords with the mores of our society. The public is entith:d to a safe and 
reasonable means to enter and exit from an open public building. . . . 
The legislative process has pointed the way. We choose to follow bc:cau�e we 
recognize that the common law of this State is not an anachronism. but is a livmg law 
which responds to the surging reality of changed conditions. We. therefore. do not 
hesitate to purify our law of what has. with the passage of time. become a most 
anomalous exception to the general common law rule of due care:' 
In the same liberal spirit. the Appellate Division. Second Department. 
held that a lessor of realty, leasing it in an "as is" condition. is nevertheless 
responsible in implied warranty for defective conditions of personal property 
that cause damage.'3 Thus product liability principles seem to have jumped 
the hurdle that has traditionally kept cases connected with the sale and rental 
of realty behind their other commercial counterparts. 
A common law anachronism that remains is a distinction between 
classes of persons on land. Business invitees can recover in cases where social 
guests and other licensees cannot; consequently. courts are constantly forced 
to distinguish between the various kinds of visitors. This year the proce�s 
went on. One case held the vendee of a one-family dwelling to be a mere 
licensee when, after the contract for the purchase of the property had been 
signed, plaintiff returned to measure the premises for drapes. He did not 
80. Gallagher v. St. Raymond's Roman Catholic Church. 21 N.Y.2d 554. 236 N .E .2d 632. 
289 N. Y.S.2d 401 (1968). 
81. Williams v. State. supra note 55. See also Alexander. Torts. /967 Surl'ey V./ ,\'} Lal\'. 
19 SYRACUSE L REV. 457. 471-7 2  (1968). 
8 2. Gallagher v. St. Raymond's Roman Catholic Church. supra note 77. at 55�. 236 
N.E.2d at 634. 289 N.Y.S.2d at 403-04. 
83. Inverso v. Whitestone Transit Mix Corp., 30 App. Div. 2d 565. 290 N. Y.S.2d 953 (2d 
Dep't 1968). 
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recover' "  On the other hand, plaintiff who drove a friend to a hospital to 
visit his wife, and who was injured on the hospital parking lot, was a 
business visitor who had a right to hold the defendant in negligence." 
A number of other defenses to tort actions were litigated during the 
year. It was contended, for example, that Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 83 
providing for the equipment of automo biles with seat belts created 
contributory negligence as a matter of law when the belts were not fastened. 
A court, surveying authorities from other states, felt that the statute imposed 
no such standard of self care." The Court of Appeals approved a judgment 
for plaintiff who, when his car was trapped by the closing of a railroad gate 
on top of it, was stilI attempting to extricate it when a train collided, killing 
him." It did so over the argument that he had a paramount duty to go to a 
place of safety, as had the other passengers, and could not properly risk his 
safety to save his property. Another court refused to read a disclaimer by a 
patron of a beauty school releasing the school of claims of liability for "all 
work performed on these premises . . .  now and forever, for any claim of 
any nature," so as to bar claim for injury when a student pushed a dryer 
into the plaintiffs nose." The case is consistent with long standing policy to 
interpret strictly releases of liability. 
Consistent with the present concern for female equality under the law, 
New York foIIowed a long line of other state decisions, by allowing a wife to 
sue for the loss of consortium of her husband.'· It is curious that New York 
and the other courts should have foIIowed this route. Suit for loss of 
consortium originated at a time when husbands were deemed to have legal 
control over their wives of a sort long since gone. The termination of the 
rationale for male loss of consortium suits should have ended that form of 
suit entirely. Instead, it seems to have generated a comparable claim for 
wives which does not even have the excuse of historical foundation."" 
l!4. Ruskowski v. Schenectady Trust Fund Co., 28 App. Div. 2d \ 0 21, 283 N.Y.S.2d 758 
(3d Dep't 1967) (mem.). 
85. Lesyk v. Park Ave. Hosp., Inc., 29 App. Div. 2d 1043, 289 N. Y.S.2d 873 (4th Dep't 
1961!) (mem.). 
l!6. Dillon v. Humphreys, 56 Misc. 2d 211, 288 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Sup. Ct., Suffolk Co. 1968). 
l!7. Greek v .  New York Central R.R. Co., 21 N.Y.2d 9 \ 3, 237 N.E.2d 72, 289 N.Y.S.2d 
7S I (1968) (mem.). 
l!l!. Wolinsky v. Queens Beauty Institute, Inc., 56 Misc. 2d 596, 289 N.Y.S.2d 647, 648 
(N. Y. City Ct., Queens Co. 1968). 
l!9. Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 2 2  N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 293 
N.Y. S.2d 305 (1968). 
90. For a history of the tort see W. PROSSER. LAW OF TORTS 895-904 (3d ed. 1964). 
